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William Gemmill and South African Expansion, 1920-1950
William Gemmill was one of South Africa's most influential mining
leaders. As administrative head of the Transvaal Chamber of
Mines, he, more than anyone, shaped the industry's policies with
regard to both white and black labour throughout the whole period
from the 1920's to the 1950's. His importance rivalled or
exceeded that of H.M Taberer, the General Superintendent of the
Native Recruiting Corporation until the early 1930's, and
influential government officials such as Sir Robert Kotze, the
Government Mining Engineer, 1910-26, or his successor, Hans
Pirow. Gemmill worked closely with other top officials, notably
with H. Warington Smyth, the Secretary for Mines and Industries
in the 1910's and 1920's, and Douglas Smit, the influential
Secretary of Native Affairs in the 1930's and 40's. None of
their careers have been adequately studied. Most of them have
not been studied at all. Like these men, he was a bureaucrat
rather than a capitalist. Like them, his extraordinary length of
tenure and thorough familiarity with mining and labour matters
frequently gave him decisive influence on policy. Gemmill's
power depended largely on personal qualities. As a Chamber of
Mines functionary, he held his position at pleasure. He did not
have the backing of one of the big mining houses. He did not
command a large personal fortune. Until the end of his career,
he remained an official of the Chamber of Mines and subject to
the control of its Executive Committee.
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Very little has been written about Gemmill. He does not
appear in the first four volumes of the Dictionary of South
African Biography. There is no reference to him in Gregory's
Oppenheimer or Cartwright's The Golden Age and Gold;Paved the
Way. Francis Wilson has a single reference to Gemmill,
concerning his move to Salisbury toward the end of his career.
He does not appear in the indexes of the books by Davies, Innes,
Johnstone and Lacey. It is only with the publication of David
Yudelman's recent book that the key role of William Gemmill has
begun to emerge. Evan so, Yudelman focused exclusively on the
problem of white labour. If anything, Gemmill had an even larger
influence on the shaping of the black labour strategies of the
period. ;
An understanding of Gemmill's role is important in
assessing the extent and limits of the power of mining capital in
these decades. His career reveals the way in which the mining
industry had become bureaucratic in organization an|d control. To
a large degree it was the functioning of this administrative
machinery and its close relations with the state bureaucracy that
determined how mining policies on labour and other (natters were
made and implemented. As historians seek to disaggregate "mining
I
capital" and to analyse policy-making in the industry, as a
crucial dimension of the role of classes in South Africa,
considerable emphasis must be given to the role of .officials.
Because of the post he held, Gemmill had to be concerned
with the welfare of the mining industry as a whole not with that
i
of any particular group. Concentration of wealth and power among
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the mining groups had been somewhat diluted since the 1890's.
Central Mining/Rand Mines, the once dominant force in the
Chamber, was clearly in decline by the 1930's, though still
powerful. Anglo-American, the coming power, had yet to achieve
commanding influence it was to secure with the opening of the
Free State fields. Consolidated Goldfields and J.C.I. were
large, independent operators. This relative balance between
several key players in the Chamber executive probably worked to
the advantage of an astute official like Gemmill.
The General Manager's responsibilities in the Chamber
bureaucracy tended to make him an advocate of stability and
continuity on policy matters. No entrepreneurial gambler, he
consistently stood for policies which would ensure slow but
steady expansion with minimum risk. In black labour policy, he
became an early advocate of tropical recruiting. He perceived
that in the distant tropical areas, the gold mines would face
local competitors who could not afford to match the industry's
low wages. He saw, furthermore, that few, if any. South African'
competitors could afford to deploy the elaborate recruiting
system which the mines had already developed for South Africa and
southern Mozambique. Also, he manoeuvred adroitly to attract the
support of state diplomacy in dealing with neighbouring
governments, especially Southern Rhodesia, to ensure that mining
objectives were secured. In these ways, the industry obtained a
pre-emptive option on the very large, still untapped supplies of
tropical labour, denied them to competitors and ensured the
stability of the supply for years to come. The effect of this
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was to make it much harder for anyone, inside the industry or
outside of it, to conceive of any alternative to migrancy.
The way in which the Chamber bureaucracy functioned helps to
explain Gemmill's extraordinary influence over the development
and implementation of black labour policy. As General Manager,
he was the reporting link for executives of the Chamber's
recruiting arm, the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) and the
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). The recruiters
reported to the Chamber's policy executive, the Gold Producers'
Committee, through Gemmill, who functioned, therefore, as chief
recruiter. In this capacity, he frequently went on tour of the
recruiting stations; personal knowledge of operations in the
field strengthened his hold on policy decisions at the centre of
operations in Johannesburg. On most matters connected with
labour, Gemmill handled the negotiations with government, both
the Union administration and neighbouring authorities. The
Portuguese respected him; the Rhodesians feared his power; and
even the United Kingdom High Commissioner was wary of the
Chamber. 2 i
Within South Africa during the 1920's, Gemmill worked
assiduously to strengthen the hold of the NRC over the principal
recruiting zones in the eastern Cape and the northern Transvaal.
With a recruiting monopoly at last in place by 1919, |the industry
could now rationalize its labour system and achieve the economies
which it had long been seeking. Gemmill presided over the
introduction of two important policy changes which in different
ways demonstrated the dominance which the Chamber had now
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achieved in the recruiting world. First, he supported the
introduction of a nine-month minimum contract for recruits. Since
the early years ot the century, the mines had allowed South
African recruits to sign six-month contracts (Mozambique workers
served much longer). These were inefficient since the worker had
barely time to learn his task before the contract expired. Short
contracts meant higher labour turnover and therefore increased
recruiting costs. The nine-month contract promised to produce
very significant economies. The price of this was paid by the
workers and their families in reduced flexibility and a longer
commitment away from the peasant economy. The recruiters also
paid in the form of a reduced number of recruiting fees. Without
the prior elimination within the industry of competitive
recruiting, these longer contracts would not have been possible.
That the mines could add fifty per cent to the contract length
also indicated that they were now more competitive in relation to
other employers.
The second measure introduced by Gemmill also demonstrated
the growing power of the industry to command its labour supply on
terms of its own choosing. Gemmill personally presided over the
introduction of the Assisted Voluntary System in the late 1920's.
Voluntary (unrecruited) labour had been an important factor in
the mines' South African labour supply since about 1909-10. This
was a popular option because it gave the worker freedom from the
recruiter and freedom to choose his employment on arrival. The
mines would often give the voluntary worker a very short
contract. However, the voluntary system required the worker to
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find his own way to Johannesburg. He needed money for
transportation and food en route, and he needed experience and
knowledge of the complex, dangerous world of the Rand. This
meant that many workers, especially the totally impoverished, the
inexperienced and the merely timid, continued to seek out the
recruiters.
To give these categories of workers an alternative to the
recruiters, the industry developed the AVS which provided small
advances in rail fare and food in return for mine work at the
industry's standard minimum contract. The AVS worker could
choose the mine where he would work, a very important
consideration. Still wary of totally alienating the recruiters,
Gemmill introduced the AVS slowly, concentrating first on the
districts where the voluntary system had been most developed (and
therefore the power of the recruiters weakest) and then extending
the system gradually to other areas in the 1930's. Essentially a
form of recruitment, the AVS worked to bind the voluntary to the
mines (against rival Rand employers) and to cut out the
recruiter-middlemen. The effect of these two measures, the
longer contract and the AVS, was to reduce recruiting costs
I
significantly and to strike a powerful blow againstjthe position
of the trader-recruiters.
In Mozambique by contrast, Gemmill had not been nearly so
successful in producing results favourable to the industry.
After many years of intermittent negotiations, the Union
government and the Chamber succeeded in renegotiating the
Transvaal-Mozambique Agreement of 1909. The revised! Mozambique
- 7 -
Convention was approved in 1928 on terms which represented
significant concessions to the Portuguese. The South African
negotiators accepted a ceiling of 80000 workers who could be
recruited annually in Mozambique (down from the prevailing
average of roughly 100000 per year) and shorter contract periods.
The Portuguese also extracted from the Union a pledge to take
effective action against the large flow of illegal immigrants who
came annually across the border and who mainly ended up on Union
farms. The effect of these measures was to threaten a labour
shortage not only on the mines but also in the agricultural lands
bordering Mozambique. As a consequence, heightened competition
for labour between the mines and farms quickly developed.
Gemmill and his colleagues countered by negotiating a so-called
Gentleman's Agreement with the Natal sugar estates. Within a few
years, they were also able to get the Portuguese quota lifted and
the ban on clandestine immigrants eased. By then, however,
important new gold discoveries on the Far West Rand, the West
Wits Line, promised to add substantially to the industry's
overall unskilled labour requirements. These developments
provide the background to the Chamber's renewed demands after
1928, that its access be restored to the populous recruiting
areas north of 22°SL.4
Employment of Jtropicals° had been banned on gold mines
because of the disastrous rates of mortality experienced by them
prior to 1913. After 1920, the Chamber resumed an active
campaign to enlarge its labour supplies and expand its influence
in the northern regions. This development in turn worked to
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entrench further the migrant labour system. The industry's
Mozambique recruiting organization, WNLA, became the principal
instrument of renewed expansion; by the 1940's, its influence
extended throughout southern Africa. WNLA's expansive thrust
into the north had important implications for the domestic supply
of black labour and for the relations between the mines and other
employers. The gold industry's need to enlarge its labour supply
derived from the twin stimuli of rapid economic expansion after
1932 and important new gold discoveries. Major consequences
followed both for the development of government labour policies
and for South Africa's relations with its neighbours.
Gemmill's analyses and the requirements of the Chamber of
Mines were very influential in shaping the regional labour and
immigration policies of the Union government during this period.
Through their London representatives, the Johannesburg mining
houses put pressure on the Colonial and Dominions offices for
support of their access to central African labour. They worked
to the same end through the United Kingdom High Commission in
Pretoria The portrayal of WNLA as the champion of' free labour
was also vigorously and successfully pushed by the mines'
i
representatives in London and at the International labour Office
in Geneva. Yet for all its economic power there remained
very definite limits on the political influence of the Chamber of
Mines. This was true in the regional context as in South Africa
itself; the farming lobby had a vital interest in the tropical
labour issue, and the Union government always showed itself
highly sensitive to farmers' needs. Northern Transvaal and
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Zuiuland planters had come to rely on clandestine alien labour.
They resisted the implementation ot" any change which seemed
likely to reduce, much less prevent, their access to this
important source. Thus control of this large flow of labour
toward South Africa became a focus of controversy within the
country in the 1930's.
As early as 1928, the Chamber began to lay its plans for
7 °
expansion into the north. In that year, WNLA sent one of its
senior employees on tour into the trans-Zambesi. Travelling by
auto, rail and ferry, P. Neergaard saw huge areas of Nyasaland,
Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and northern Mozambique. He
returned with glowing reports on the labour potential of these
areas and the ease with which WNLA could establish itself in
them. Armed with these optimistic estimates and, after 1932
with the approval of the Union authorities for a new round of
experiments with "tropicals", Gemmill began negotiations with
neighbouring governments for renewed access to the northern
territories for WNLA recruiters.
The discussions with the Southern Rhodesians were extremely
tough. "If Mr. Gemmill is not appeased the Witwatersrand can
entice labour without any conditions at all", concluded Southern
Rhodesia's Secretary of Native Affairs This same official
earlier referred to the "chaotic state of scrambling for labour
on our borders". He feared that "the labour war has begun"12
and that the activities of WNLA would soon result in generalized
competition as rival employers within Southern Rhodesia fell
upon each other. Not only would the colony's long-established
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dominance in the adjacent parts of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia be placed at risk but also its hard-won controls on the
domestic Rhodesian labour market would now be threatened with
disruption. Local employers would certainly to try to emulate
WNLA's aggressive ways and probably to attack each other rather
than the much more powerful WNLA. The larger employers could
look after themselves but the smaller ones would be driven out of
the labour market. Moreover, existing high rates of "leakage" of
unrecruited "voluntaries" to the Union left little doubt that
active recruiting by an agency as formidably well-financed and
organized as WNLA would succeed in stripping the tropical areas
much of their labour.
By the later 1930's, the Southern Rhodesian government had
developed harsh countermeasures to Union pressure on its labour
supplies. This reflected official recognition of the weakness of
Southern Rhodesia's competitive position in the looming struggle
for labour. Not only were the Rhodesians losing their own labour,
but also they were losing control of their traditional outside
sources, as migration flowed increasingly to the subcontinental
poles of the mining economy, the Copperbelt and the Rand. To try
to interdict the southern stream, Huggins put legislation through
Parliament in 1938 to exclude Africans without passes from a
defined twenty-five mile zone along the colony's Limpopo border
with the Union. Motorcycle police would patrol this
cordon sanitaire intensively, and lorry transport services used
by the migrants would be curtailed and monitored for clandestine
emigrants. Although never implemented, this measure was dramatic
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evidence of the lengths to which the Rhodesians were prepared to
go in order to protect their labour. It was meant as a threat and
taken to be one, as subsequent negotiations with the South
Africans showed.
The Prime Minister and his colleagues were by no means
content with a defensive strategy in these years. They moved
vigorously to compete with WNLA in the prime recruiting zones of
central and northern Nyasaland. Rest camps were established
along the main transport routes and an elaborate lorry service
created. They opened negotiations with the Northern Rhodesian
government to place steamers at crossing points on the Zambesi so
that part at least of the labour flow could be diverted from the
WNLA base at Kazungula. They also used patriotic and Imperial
arguments to prevail on their northern colleagues to give
preference to Rhodesian employers over those of the Union,
claiming that otherwise the central African territories would
inevitably fall into the economic (perhaps even the political)
orbit of South Africa. While Huggins failed to exclude the
Rand recruiters from Rhodesia's main recruiting preserves, his
diplomacy did slow the South Africans down and contributed to the
slow growth in the number of WNLA tropical recruits.
By agreeing to talk to Gemmill and his agents, colonial
governments in the target areas, especially Southern Rhodesia,
managed to restrain WNLA's demands and to secure some agreed
limits on the total outflow of labour to the south. The
interests of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, of course, differed
trom those of Southern Rhodesia. With an acknowledged labour
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"surplus"/ limited local employment opportunities and depressed
economies, they were very much alive to the revenue implications
of Gemmill's approaches. Furthermore, they knew that southern
Rhodesia was getting their labour at bargain rates, and they were
not averse to its employers having to respond to competition from
1 fithe formidable WNLA. Still, both governments had to contend
with settler and planter lobbies, not to mention Copperbelt mine
owners in the case of Northern Rhodesia, who feared the
inevitable pressure to raise wages which WNLA would bring. The
Nyasaland government especially also professed alarmed at the
disruptive social effects which large scale migration of the
adult males had already caused in some districts. Such arguments
in the hands of officials must be treated with caution, however.
Local settlers also used them to cloak their deter-mlination to
protect their privileged access to semi-servile black farm
labour.18
While the amounts of recruited labour to the mines from the
i
tropical regions were small up to 1939 (less than 10 per cent of
the total supply), WNLA and the Chamber considered that their
commitment to this enterprise was an investment for the
future. As the industry's recruiting experts saw the problem,
their expanding needs could only be met from outside the Union
and Mozambique. There were many signs that the goldl mines were
increasingly uncompetitive in South Africa's own labour markets;
and the potential of the southern parts of Portuguese East Africa
had been pretty much fully tapped. It is not surprising that
Gemmill and his associates would turn their attention to the
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tropical northern areas. Hence the later 1930's and 1940's saw
WNLA and the Chamber oE Mines committing large funds to the
development of transport networks (road and air), rest camps and
medical facilities which would enable them to exploit the labour
resources of these target areas. In northern Botswana,
WNLA's contribution to basic economic infrastructure was
enormous, reflecting the association's understanding of the
strategic significance of the territory. Not unimportant itself
as a potential source of new recruits, Bechuanaland was vital as
the mines' recruiting highway around the Rhodesians into the
north and north-west. As the mining economy entered its most
expansive decades, Bechuanaland regained much of the strategic
significance it had had in the heyday of Imperial expansion in
the 1880's and 90's. Rhodesia's Hugginr. had indicated from the
start that he would do everything possible to thwart WNLA's plans
and to impede the flow of labour from and through his colony.
Communications were difficult through Mozambique. This left
Bechuanaland.
Even when negotiations with the Rhodesians produced
agreements between 1936-9, WNLA's stake in Bechuanaland remained
important as a standing demonstration that from this base, with
or without the cooperation of the other governments, the
Association could tap the labour supplies of the entire region.
From its new depot at Francistown, it built roads north to
Kazungula at the confluence of the Chobe and the Zambesi rivers
and west to Ghanzi (continuing eventually to Grootfontein in
South West Africa) across the central Kalahari where only tracks
- 14 -
had existed before. It was WNLA and not the colonial
government that opened the modern road from Francistown to Maun
and from there to Mohembo on the Okavango River. Eventually,
WNLA had constructed over 800 miles of roads in northern
Bechuanaland alone; and had in addition established motor barge
transport on the Zambesi and through the Okavango. This major
contribution to infrastructure was paralleled by similar
activities in northern Nyasaland and Barotseland.
The Chamber of Mines underwrote the expansion of colonial
medical services in Bechuanaland and the other High Commission
Territories with modest grants-in-aid to support the training of
paramedical staff and the establishment of mobile clinics. This
was partly to improve the chronically poor health of the target
population, numbers of whose males would now have to meet the
medical standard established by WNLA for mine recruits. Loss of
labour through medical rejection was wasteful in itself but it
also affected the willingness of all blacks to come forward from
long distances when there was a high risk of being turned back on
health grounds. Clearly also, the Chamber sought by its grants-
in-aid to cultivate the goodwill of the impoverished authorities
at Mafeking.23
Despite major improvements in hospital and other medical
facilities on the mines, black miners remained at serious risk
from continuing high rates of illness and accident. While
the banning of tropical recruitment in 1913 led to sharp falls in
the incidence of pneumonia, tuberculosis and other lung ailments
continued to exact a heavy toll. Since few of the black miners
- 15 -
served long or continuously enough to contract miners' phthisis
the elaborate precautions mandated by the state under successive
Phthisis Acts benefitted exclusively the white mine workers.
Reviewing the state of health legislation and policy in 1924, the
Secretary for Mines drew attention to the inadequate precautions
against tuberculosis that were taken by the companies when
engaging black mine workers.
... It is computed that during the past twenty years,
an ARMY of 20,000 OR MORE tuberculous NATIVES tsic) have been
discharged by the Mines and sent back to their Kraals to
spread the disease amongst the millions of their race, while
quite 10,000 must have found employment in other industries
and with Europeans during the same period of twenty
years....I am informed by competent authority that this
terribly dreaded disease which is both infectious and
contagious is absolutely rampant amongst the natives in our
country and it seems that the position is seriously
aggravated by hosts of tuberculotic natives who are sent
back every year [by the mines] to their kraals to carry the
contagion. The position is too dreadful to think
about.25
What-made the deficiencies in the mine medical examination
and the lack of a routine X-Ray screen particularly serious was
the poor health of the target population. Evidence available to
industry medical officers suggested that general health in the
labour pools from which the mines were drawing continued to
decline. By 1934, roughly twenty per cent of Transkeian Africans
examined failed the mine medical, though it remained
substantially unchanged from the cursory, unsatisfactory
examination condemned by the Secretary for Mines ten years
earlier. During 1934, something like 20000 workers in the
Transkei alone were rejected for mine work. About another five
thousand failed the medical at the WNLA compound on arrival in
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Johannesburg. Most of these would be given surface work since
the immediate return o£ rejected workers caused adverse comment
in the territories and hurt recruiting.
Under pressure from the Native Affairs department to
increase employment of Transkeian Africans, Chamber
representatives declined to authorize the NRC to recruit for the
Natal sugar and wattle planters (outside the malarial zone) but
did say there would be no objection to recruiters from the
estates being present at the medical to offer immediate
employment to the rejects. The proposal merely regularized
what had been going on routinely throughout the Union on an
informal basis. Since the mines paid more than the farms, they
got the pick of the fit labour. The sick, the weak and those too
young or too old went to the farms. This pattern would be
repeated as the industry now began to extend its recruiting
effort into the north. Routine X-Ray chest examinations of
workers not suspected of lung disease were not a regular part of
the medical programme, indicating that costs remained a key
determinant of policy.
During 1935 when the debate on tropical labour was at a
critical stage, a significant exchange of correspondence took
place between William Gemmill and C.F. Rey, the Resident
Commissioner of Bechuanaland. On the recommendation of his
principal medical officer, Rey argued that the mines should
provide an X-Ray screen for all returning mine workers so that
cases of TB might be caught at the very earliest stages when
treatment and isolation were most likely to prevent the spread of
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the disease. Refusing this, Gemmill and his colleagues argued in
effect that TB was not a "mining disease" and that their medical
officers should not have special responsibility to treat .it. As
late as 1943 Gemmill told the Lansdown Commission on African mine
wages that there was no serious health problem in the "native
territories" for the mines to be concerned about. It was a
typically brazen performance which the Commission easily refuted
on the basis of public information. Every contemporary study
demonstrated that in all of the recruiting areas, tuberculosis
was a major menace to the mines' target population and migration
to the Rand a principal source of infection and reinfection.
When Industry spokesmen were prepared to admit thisf they
denied the conclusion that found the mining industry mainly
responsible. Without question routine X-Ray examinations would
have reduced the incidence of infection of mine workers both on
the mines and after they were at home. The further spread of the
disease would in this way have been checked. It would also have
dramatically increased costs, both for the examinations
themselves and even more for the treatment which would have been
necessary. To say that this step would have been expensive was
correct; to argue that it was "wholly unnecessary" was seriously
at variance with known facts. Although its medical facilities
and health precautions far exceeded those provided to blacks
either by government or other employers anywhere in southern
Africa, the gold industry declined to take all of the health
precautions that were available to it and found a variety of
"sociological", economic and medical reasons to justify this.
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Eventually, in the 1940's the Chamber reversed itself and
introduced a comprehensive X-Ray screen.
By the end of the 1930's, WNLA had the key elements of its
northern strategy in place and accepted by the northern
governments. It established a regional headquarters in Salisbury
and concluded a formal agreement with the colonial
administrations of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. This gave the association the right to establish its
depots, camps and transport systems throughout Barotseland and
northern Nyasaland. In return, Gemmill undertook that the mines
would not engage northern "voluntaries" within South Africa
itself.32 This was an extremely important concession. The
northern governments knew that the mines were the magnet for most
of their clandestine migrants, thousands of whom never returned,
becoming the so-called "lost ones". The 1939 agreement offered a
means of checking that unregulated flow of labour, much of it
permanently lost to the supplying territories, which neither
police border patrols nor pass laws and other controls had been
able to contain or prevent. By arrangement with the Chamber this
labour could now be diverted into WNLA channels with repatriation
at the end of the contract period guaranteed. What the
governments had been unable to do with their police, what they
had failed to persuade the Union to accomplish with its forces,
might now be achieved by agreement with WNLA. To the Chamber of
Mines, labour was a resource like any other; a territory which
failed to develop this resource should not be allowed to retain
it.
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These dealings between Gemmill and the northern colonies
had implications which were equally serious for WNLA's South
African competitors, especially the mines and farms of the
northern Transvaal. Many of the clandestine immigrants, although
intending to travel as quickly as possible to the gold mines, in
fact ended up working for farmers as soon as they crossed the
Limpopo. Either they never got to the gold mines at all or would
do so only after an interval of very low-wage employment on some
border farm or mine. During the 1930's, 'the Onion had
established depots and police patrols to catch as much as
possible of this labour and force it either to accept local
employment or to be put back across the border. Although
ineffective in stopping the inflow into the Union, these police
measures did force many of the immigrants to seek shelter in
uncongenial, low wage employment on some local farm or mine.
Private recruiters prowled in these regions touting for
labour on behalf of individual estates and various farming
collectives. Now these clandestine migrants, denied any prospect
of employment on gold mines by Gemmlll's 1939 deal with the three
supplying governments unless they accepted recruitment for them
in their home territory, would necessarily flow into the channels
carefully constructed by the recruiting association. Clandestine
migrants could no longer count on mining employment even if they
did succeed in running the gauntlet of predatory farmers and
labour touts in the border areas. WNLA had managed to divert at
source part of the migration which formerly had provided northern
Transvaal and Zululand farmers with much of their labour.
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Although the pay-off in substantially enhanced labour flows
was agonizingly slow to materialize, WNLA, under the leadership
of William Gemmill, had definitely committed itself by the mid-
19303 to a vast and expensive extension of its recruiting network
into the north.34 Coming as it did at the beginning stages of the
industry's most expansive and profitable decades, the emerging
tropical labour strategy did much to determine the mines' overall
labour policies for the next three decades. Naturally this heavy
investment in the development of the migrant labour system, made
it the more difficult for Chamber of Mines executives to consider
seriously real alternatives to its low wage labour policies based
on maximum utilization of transitory, unskilled blacks.
The extension of the gold mines labour system into the
northern territories had a decisive impact on the economic future
of the whole subcontinent. Equally with railway development,
WNLA's powerful presence throughout the region bound the
periphery to the mining heartland. Although inward labour flows
to the higher wages and relative economic opportunities of the
South African economy long predated the development of the mines'
tropical recruiting enterprise, that system helped to ensure that
the resulting regional interdependence would become structural
and enduring. Yet there were limits to South African hegemony,
despite the economic weakness of its neighbours. The political
history of the period demonstrates that the colonial
administrations in the supplying territories, led by Southern
Rhodesia, were no happier with their dependence on South Africa
than the successor governments, organized in the SADCC, are to-
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i day. It also shows how political arrangements could be used at
I •, least partially to offset economic dependence.
i *
1
 Rhodesia's Huggins did not prevent WNLA's expansion into the
north, but he did influence its shape and timing and successfully
restricted its scope for many years. The target British
territories to the north were uneasy allies with sharply
different objectives, but they did share an interest in
controlling, restricting and profitting from the penetration of
the South Africans. Consequently, Huggins' efforts to unite them
against their powerful southern neighbour met with some success.
Partly for this reason, Gemmill and his colleagues in the Chamber
of Mines found it expedient to conciliate rather than merely to
confront their Rhodesian rival. At a time when South Africa's
dependence on its neighbours for labour is waning, there may
still be lessons in this history for those who study the
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